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IN THIS ESSAY I BEGIN BY NAMING A "TURN TO CULTURE" THAT MARKS A 
wide range of works in contemporary theology and ethics. I describe how the 
turn plays out in books by Stanley Hauerwas and Delores S. Williams and argue 
that their idealist versions of the turn uncritically replicate core features of the 
dominant cultures they try to criticize. I explain how their idealism in conceiv-
ing the oppositional cultures to which they turn constructs those cultures as 
"others" to the culture being criticized, wholes unto themselves, and symbols 
that directly participate in some ultimate good or truth. I then gesture toward a 
more critical, self-conscious performance of the turn to culture. I argue that 
turns to culture should not obscure but rather thematize the role of the critic in 
making the turn. I use the work of Pierre Bourdieu and Walter Benjamin to ar-
gue that self-conscious critique will involve a set of resignations to reflexivity 
rather than otherness, to a hodgepodge of highly mobile practices rather than a 
single, unified tradition, and to regarding cultural artifacts as mixed allegories 
rather than pure symbols. 
A turn to culture marks many contemporary works in theology and ethics. By turning to culture I mean, most broadly, taking the practices, beliefs, narratives, or traditions of a particular community as starting points for 
normative or theological reflection. Christian thinkers have taken cultural turns 
in a variety of directions with a variety of not necessarily compatible motives. 
Loss of confidence in a reason transcending every culture has led to rationalities 
based on the traditions or experiences of particular groups of people. Concern 
about individualism has brought new or renewed emphasis on communities of 
various forms. Recognition of long-marginalized people and groups has urged 
new attention to voices defined in part by membership in those groups. Repen-
tance of excessive attention to the ideas of textual elites has given imperni to in-
terpretation of material and oral cultures. Weariness with impoverished rituals 
and symbols has driven renewed consideration of liturgical practices with the 
confidence that they manifest knowledge of God. Arising from a wide variety of 
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concerns and taking an even wider variety of forms, the cultural turn is a sign of 
the times—a time signature bringing a shared sensibility to many beats and 
tunes. 
Turns to culture have not been limited to the guilds of Christian theolo­
gians. "Culture wars" have swollen in political importance, often displacing all 
other issues. Culture industries have risen to play increasingly important roles 
in the global economy. In intellectual life, anthropology and sociology have 
shown growing power to legitimate other kinds of discourse. These disciplines 
seem to fit the times, and other disciplines borrow from them more and more. 
Christian thinkers across many spectrums join in that borrowing. Postliberal, 
womanist, pragmatist, feminist, liberationist, mujerista, and radically orthodox 
thinkers may rarely attend the same sessions at conferences, but they share in a 
broad and contentious turn to some kind of culture as a starting point for theol­
ogy and ethics. It has become a commonplace that there is no "view from no­
where" and that the somewhere from which all views look is, in some important 
sense, "cultural."1 
One of the greatest attractions of cultural turns has been their ability to 
swerve around the roadblocks of modernist epistemology. Christian speech 
about God and God's hope for the world became problematic for many theolo­
gians and ethicists who became convinced that all speech about God, even 
scripture, was culturally or historically conditioned. When this concession 
joined convictions that God stood genuinely apart from any particular human 
culture, theologians and ethicists found themselves able to say less and less 
about God's ways with the world. At their best, as in the ascetic theology of 
James M. Gustafson, they could trace with precision what they could and could 
not say. They tended to make more constructive claims only with elaborate hes­
itation and qualification, however—perhaps finally smuggling a norm in 
through a side door, just out of sight of the gates of method. 
Cultural turns have promised to evade the epistemological block on moral 
and theological claims by making claims first about publicly accessible cultural 
forms: T h e church has believed these doctrines; the community of enslaved 
women and their descendents is engaged in these practices of resistance and 
survival; and the American polity has displayed these democratic virtues and 
habits. Such claims can be verified easily enough—or at least verified to meet 
the standards of guilds of historians, sociologists, and anthropologists. T h e 
price of verifiability, however, has been the question of normativity. How can 
one move from claims about what people do in fact believe to claims about what 
is true? How can one move from descriptive claims about the practices of a 
community to claims about what anyone—even people in that community— 
ought to do? How can one move from fact to norm, from is to ought} These 
questions are familiar for academic theologians and ethicists, and I rely on their 
familiarity to supply the wider context of this essay.2 
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I also rely on that familiarity to suggest just how many of "us"—contempo-
rary theologians and religious ethicists, more and less academically trained—al-
ready work from some kind of cultural turn. I do not argue that all theologians 
and ethicists must turn to culture, only that many already have. (After all, how 
could I argue that there could never be a "view from nowhere" except by taking 
up that very view from nowhere—the perspective outside of and above all his-
torical and cultural particularity?) In naming the present turn to culture, there-
fore, I am not trying to start from scratch, even in saying we must not start from 
scratch. I make the more limited empirical point that claims to direct access to 
revelation or reason above any particularity have become unpersuasive or unat-
tractive for a variety of reasons. If not every theologian has agreed to make a 
cultural turn, the burden of proof clearly has shifted to those making claims to 
start with something beyond every particular culture. I take the turn for granted 
as a powerful element of contemporary cultures of theology and ethics. In this 
essay I try to reflect critically on that turn without claiming a location above or 
outside of it. That is, I try to make a cultural turn to the cultural turn. 
Turning to the cultural turn means starting with it but does not mean ac-
cepting it as it presents itself. The cultural turn of this essay starts front some 
methodological commitments and practices of contemporary theologians but 
then looks for fissures within them—places where their broken edges point to 
something beyond themselves. 
Turns to Invisible Church Cultures 
No one has done more to turn theologians to church cultures in recent years 
than Stanley Hauerwas. In his 2001 Gifford Lectures, Hauerwas praised Karl 
Barth's insistence on the radical difference between God and the created world 
but criticized Barth for suggesting an ecclesiology that was too barren to allow 
the Word of God to be comprehensible.3 Hauerwas argued that Barth's insis-
tence on otherness did not undo the need for some kind of analogia fidei, some 
at least analogical connection to God that could serve as the bridge across 
which faith and grace might travel. Although God and creatures could not be 
identical, they also could not be "utterly lacking in resemblance." A total lack of 
resemblance would make impossible human recognition of and hence relation-
ship to God. Moreover, because the Word of God was love incarnate, most it-
self when it was most for creation, its own nature required that it be compre-
hensible and so bear some at least analogous relationship to something in 
creation. To be the Word of God, the Word of God had to appear, had to be 
spoken, even if only analogically. And where that Word was spoken was, by def-
inition, church.4 
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Hauerwas acknowledged that this imperative for the church went beyond 
Barth's explicit intentions: "Barth says that the knowledge of God 'can' be real­
ized in the church; I would say that it 'must' be so realized." Hauerwas de­
scribed his move from can to must as merely the intensification of Barth's argu­
ment—a helping hand to lift Barth over his theological "hesitancy" to the 
courage of his practical convictions.5 Hauerwas performed a much more funda­
mental reversal of Barth's thought, however. For Hauerwas, the Word had to 
be spoken in the church to be intelligible and, hence, to be the Word. Church 
was logically prior to the Word, necessary for it to be the Word at all. T h e 
church made the Word the Word through its witness. This was a perfect inver­
sion of Barth, for whom the Word made the church every time there was the 
event of church. For Barth there could be no stable, prior body that satisfied 
what Hauerwas called the "material conditions" of witness. T h e sole condition, 
material and otherwise, was God's decision to be known. Hauerwas named the 
contrast most clearly: "Barth, of course, did not deny that the church is consti­
tuted by the proclamation of the gospel. What he cannot acknowledge is that 
the community called the church is constitutive of the gospel proclamation."6 For 
Barth church was constituted by the gospel; for Hauerwas church was constitu­
tive o/the gospel. With this distinction Hauerwas crystallized a turn to culture 
in one of its strongest forms: T h e culture of church was not only necessary for 
knowledge of the Word but therefore and also the very substance of the Word. 
For the church to be constitutive of the gospel proclamation, it had to be 
holy. Its ability to witness—and hence the Word's ability to be intelligible, and 
hence the Word's ability to be the Word—depended on the holiness of the 
church. That holiness, the church's analogical similarity to God, became in 
Hauerwas's arguments absolutely necessary for the work of God in the world. 
That holiness, by definition, set the church apart as radically distinct from "the 
world." Thus, Hauerwas effectively relocated Barth's notion of the otherness of 
God. N o longer was the Word of God wholly other to all creation because it 
found its necessary analogue in the church. Now an inseparable church and 
Word stood as completely other to the world. Because otherness was relocated 
and not redefined, however, the problem of knowledge Hauerwas sought to 
solve through appeal to the analogia fidei remained. If the church was so holy, so 
other, how could the world recognize it? And if the world could not recognize 
it, how could the church live out its vocation for the world? Hauerwas worried 
over the material conditions necessary for the recognition of the Word, but he 
created the problem of the material conditions necessary for recognition of the 
church.7 
Hauerwas's insistence on the necessity of a holy church that was radically 
distinct from the world also created the problem of saying just where and when 
that church existed. T o be the church, the material condition of the gospel, it 
had to be in this world; to be holy, it had to be perfect and other. Where was it? 
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At the end of With the Grain of the Universe, Hauerwas pointed to the holy, visi-
ble, necessary church in the persons of John Howard Yoder and Pope John Paul 
II. These two individuals demonstrated the virtues necessary for witness, 
Hauerwas said. Let us grant that contentious point, but then notice the irony 
that they represent the virtues necessary for witness as individuals. No earthly 
institution encompassed these two men. They were the saints of no single visi-
ble community. The holiness of the two therefore argued less for one holy cath-
olic and apostolic church in this world than for many visible churches rmarked 
by institutional pluralism, a variety of charismata, and unity only in an invisible 
or eschatological sense. Hauerwas's church came into earthly, visible, positive 
existence—the kind of existence necessary for it to ground a turn to culture or 
satisfy the material conditions necessary for recognition of the Word—only as 
he called it into being. Hauerwas made a cultural turn to a church of his own 
creation. It is not too much to say that Hauerwas performed Christian ethics as 
a Sittlichkeit of an invisible church, a derivation of ought from conjured is. 
In Sisters in the Wilderness (1993), Delores S. Williams turned to a very dif-
ferent church from the one that Hauerwas crafted, but she made the turn in re-
markably similar ways. Williams argued against any pretense of neutral theo-
logical vantage point as mere cover for the replication of sexist and Eurocentric 
categories. Instead, she wrote, she wanted to consider "what it means to take se-
riously (as a primary theological source) the faith, thought and life-struggle of 
African American women." Like Hauerwas, Williams rejected any word or 
Word, reason or doctrine, that claimed to hover above cultural particularity; in-
stead, she embraced as "primary theological source" a community she saw as a 
distinct alternative to the dominant culture. African American churches need 
doctrinal systems, Williams wrote, "but they need doctrine that emerges from 
African American people's experience with God, not doctrine inherited' from 
oppressive Eurocentric forms of Christianity, not female-exclusive doctrine 
formulated centuries ago by male potentates." The critical leverage against rac-
ist doctrine would not come from reason or revelation to some abstract individ-
ual but from the particular culture of African American women. The distinct 
otherness of African American women's culture let Williams turn to it as a criti-
cal resource for a theology that would be able to bear witness against racism, 
sexism, and economic injustice.8 
Williams made her turn through a focal point that added both complexity 
and memorable clarity to her argument. She took up the story of Hagar—the 
woman who saw and named God, provided for her child in the face of murder-
ous oppression, and found ways to be faithful while living as slave and Concu-
bine (see Genesis 16:1-16 and 21:9-21). Hagar's story made sense as a means 
for excavating the culture of African American women because it "had been ap-
propriated so extensively and for such a long time by the African American 
community" and because of the remarkable "congruence" between Hagar's 
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story and the lives of African American women. For centuries African American 
women had found in the Hagar story a place to think about the "poverty, sexual 
and economic exploitation, surrogacy, domestic violence, homelessness, rape, 
motherhood, single-parenting, ethnicity, and meetings with God" that marked 
their own lives. Hagar's story therefore began to offer a way to condense and 
draw together many themes of the culture of African American women.9 
Although Williams used the Hagar story as a focal point, she made clear that 
the story did not have critical power over the culture of African American 
women. She rejected interpretations of the story that supported slavery and sur­
rogacy, whether they came from slave master preachers or Paul's letter to the 
Galatians (or both). Instead, she wrote, the story of Hagar must be read through 
the "survival and quality-of-life tradition of African-American biblical appropria­
tion."10 For Williams the story of Hagar did not stand over, above, or against 
the community of African American women but with and within their interpre­
tive traditions. Thus, Williams and Hauerwas made parallel moves, each block­
ing appeal to something beyond the culture to which they turned by capturing 
all other sources of authority within it. 
Although Williams took up the experience of African American women as 
the primary source for her theology, she resisted easy temptations to romanti­
cize black women's Christian faith. She argued that any turn to the faith of Afri­
can American women had to acknowledge the "colonization of female mind and 
culture" and the sexism that lingered in the African American denominational 
churches.1 1 Thus, she wrote, 
The womanist theology in this book makes a distinction between the black 
church as invisible and rooted in the soul of community memory and the Af­
rican American denominational churches as visible. Contrary to the nomen­
clature in current black theological, historical and sociological works, in this 
book the black church is not used to name both the invisible black church and 
the African American denominational churches.12 
Using the language of the Reformed traditions to which she is heir, Williams 
distinguished the visible African American denominational churches and the in­
visible black church "rooted in the soul of community memory." "The black 
church is invisible," she wrote, "but we know it when we see oppressed people 
rising up to freedom." It appeared in the lives and deeds of Harriet Tubman, 
Sojourner Truth, Mary McLeod Bethune, and Rosa Parks. It appeared in the 
Universal Hagar's Spiritual Church, part of the black spiritualist tradition, 
which offered a heterodox and syncretist glimpse of the true black church. Yet 
even the Universal Hagar's Church required sifting and sorting by principles of 
liberation. Williams's invisible black church was both ideal and real, but it was 
not limited by the boundaries of any earthly community: "It has neither hands 
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nor feet nor form, but we know when we feel it in our communities as neither 
Christianity, nor Islam, nor Judaism, nor Buddhism, nor Confucianism, nor 
any human-made religion." Williams turned not to some predefined, preexist-
ing culture but to one she delimited and created even as she turned to it as re-
source.13 
At just this point the homologies between Williams and Hauerwas begin to 
become visible. Both theologians gained critical leverage by appealing to some 
culture as an "other" to a presumed dominant modern culture. Hauerwas and 
Williams called different rolls of saints and highlighted different incarnations of 
the true church: John Howard Yoder, Pope John Paul II, and the Mennonite 
Church on one hand, and Sojourner Truth, Mary McLeod Bethune, and the 
Universal Hagar's Spiritual Church on the other. The critical leverage of each 
counterculture depended on the presumed otherness of these people and insti-
tutions. Because Williams and Hauerwas drew the boundaries of those "other" 
cultures through their own critical selections, however, they reproduced, in the 
deepest form of their works, a crucial part of the culture they both tried to re-
sist. Both Hauerwas and Williams adopted the position of a modern individual, 
standing at a critical distance from traditions and communities and sorting 
through those cultures to elect participation in them according to affinities of 
value, doctrine, or style. Although both Williams and Hauerwas appealed to 
persons, practices, and communities that seemed to stand apart from a moder-
nity that alienated individuals from cultures, their means of appropriating those 
cultures transformed the cultures into "resources" that they, as critics, could 
sort and deploy at will. Made into resources, even things that once were other 
became familiar. Like King Midas, Hauerwas and Williams turned everything 
they touched into what they already had in superabundance.14 
Critical Resignations 
Hauerwas and Williams turned to different cultures, from different locations, 
and with different critical agendas. Those differences mattered morally and 
theologically. Yet the formal similarities of the arguments—the roles, practices, 
moods, and perspectives they shared—also had moral and theological signifi-
cance. Both Hauerwas and Williams could be described as performing what 
Jeffrey Stout called "moral bricolage"—a kind of criticism that begins "wkh bits 
and pieces of received linguistic material, arranges some of them into a struc-
tured whole, leaves others to the side, and ends up with a moral language one 
proposes to use." As Stout argued, a bricoleur can construct criticism on many 
kinds of topics and for many different purposes. But the bricoleur also enacts one 
of the central roles in the dominant cultures of our time: The bricoleur acts as a 
modern, critical individual who evaluates cultural artifacts and cobbles them 
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together as resources for action toward ends of his or her own choosing. When 
Hauerwas and Williams engaged in bricolage, they ended up reproducing with­
out critique that role of bricoleur, and hence a crucial part of the cultures in 
which it finds a home. 1 5 
How could one critique the deepest presumptions of contemporary cultures 
that make cultural critique their hallmark? T h e very idea seems self-defeating—a 
kind of logical trap. And why would a body want to criticize cultures of critique? 
One could argue that practices of critical bricolage emerged through long proc­
esses of social learning and hence represent the best wisdom of humankind.1 6 But 
the power of a critical culture to co-opt its critics begins to suggest the need for 
further critique. When the perspective of a person who stands at some distance 
from every particular culture has become practically inescapable, often invisible, 
and very difficult to question, it has become a kind of new mythology. It has its 
own fatalism, unconscious rituals, and ceremonial roles. A person who valued the 
social achievement of such a perspective would have to insist on turning it back 
upon itself now that it has become almost uncritically accepted because without 
some critical self-awareness it does not fulfill its promise.1 7 
T h e potentially hegemonic, even mythological qualities of the practices of 
bricolage begin to suggest some means for making this move to turn cultural 
criticism back upon itself. It makes little sense to try to go "outside" the prac­
tices of bricolage—not because there are or were no cultural practices apart from 
cultures of critical appropriation but because as soon as we pick them up and 
consciously deploy them with critical intent we and they end up melting back 
into familiar roles within the practice of bricolage. Instead, criticism at this par­
ticular moment should proceed by seeking out rifts and crevices within the 
practice of bricolage itself. This is not a turn to some carefully selected "other" 
culture as resource, like the moves of Hauerwas and Williams, but a kind of res­
ignation to a dominant culture in which we already stand, like it or not. Curi­
ously, the way to be not of this world will be to immerse ourselves in it. 
A critical reimmersion in the practice of bricolage begins by making visible 
the work of the bricoleur. Hauerwas and Williams uncritically replicated a cul­
ture of modern, critical individuals in part because they obscured the role of 
prior ideals in constructing the cultures to which they turned. Hauerwas started 
with ideals of pacifism, authority, and community and then made the culture 
that included John Howard Yoder and Pope John Paul II in the image of those 
ideals, and so of his own position as critic. Williams started with ideals of sur­
vival and quality of life and then sifted and sorted through empirical African 
American churches to find pieces from which she could construct the invisible 
black church. In each case the critic's initial ideals, "realized" in the culture of 
the critic's making, disappeared and then reappeared with new authority. 
T h e use of prior ideals to define cultures for critique has tended to produce 
cultures with three distinctive qualities in common. Like the church cultures 
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created by Williams and Hauerwas, cultures defined by ideals have tended to be 
other to the culture being criticized, wholes unto themselves, and ideal in the 
sense of realizing some ultimate good or truth. Each of those qualities comes 
about because of the role of the prior ideal in defining the culture that would 
provide critical leverage. When critics have conceived an ideal such as "libera-
tion," "tradition," or "democracy" as counter to a dominant culture and then 
composed a culture from bits and pieces that seemed to embody that ideal, the 
critical culture has emerged as other to the dominant culture in exactly the ways 
the original principle was other to that dominant culture. When critics have se-
lected cultural materials that embodied the same ideal or produced the same 
end, they have composed cultures that are unified to the precise degree of the 
unity internal to the concept and the skill of its application. And when critics 
have composed cultures by selecting disjointed "enclaves" that embodied some 
ideal, of course those fragments have become ideal—both in the sense of turn-
ing into ideas, breaking their ties to the material flow of history, and in the sense 
of becoming idyllic or perfect. Avoiding idealism that becomes less than critical, 
then, would involve giving up these three attractive features, or at least ac-
knowledging the critic's role in producing them. It would mean resignation to a 
culture that is neither entirely other, nor whole, nor ideal.18 
A Resignation to Reflexivity 
Giving up the otherness promised by uncritical idealism begins with a resigna-
tion to reflexivity. Critical leverage on a culture oí bricolage will come not from 
absolute difference but from similarity made visible. The critical potential of 
the bricolage of Hauerwas and Williams depended on the apparent otherness of 
certain persons, beliefs, or practices to the order the critic wanted to engage. 
Hauerwas, for instance, could mobilize John Howard Yoder and the Menno-
nite community he stood in for in Hauerwas's thought to critique a society 
drunk on violent effectiveness and therefore too comfortable with its own dirty 
hands. The otherness of Yoder as a person, however, obscured the sameness of 
Yoder as a resource for bricolage. As that sameness disappeared from sight, it— 
and the practice of bricolage with it—became exempt from critique. Ironically, 
just the otherness that seemed to offer critical potential became a blind spot of 
uncritical participation. Resigning oneself to reflexivity requires forgoing temp-
tations to appeal to the otherness of "other" cultures and turning instead to per-
sons and practices that could help bring the critic's actual cultural locations into 
sharper focus.19 
A resignation to reflexivity might involve turning to stories, persons, and 
practices closer in time and space to the critic making the turn. Instead of evok-
ing the pristine wonders of a long-lost Latin mass, for instance, the critic might 
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turn to the messy compromise being celebrated just around the corner. Spatial 
and temporal proximities do not necessarily bring reflexivity, however, just as 
spatial and temporal distances do not necessarily generate otherness. How a 
critic makes the cultural turn matters more than the location of the culture to 
which a critic turns. The angle of vision matters more than the distance of the 
line of sight. The self-reflexive bricoleur would turn to a culture that the bricoleur 
understands as in some ways connected to his or her own location—and specifi­
cally to his or her own location as a bricoleur, the location the bricoleur inhabits as 
a critic. A self-reflexive bricoleur might still turn to a medieval version of the 
mass, for instance, but the mass would not function in his or her criticism as a 
locus of pure and transcendent difference. It would function instead as a site of 
both similarity and difference—already itself a kind of bricolage whose distinct 
form might bring the bricoleur1 % own practice and role into critical perspective. 
Christians might think of resignations to reflexivity as acknowledgments of 
our created, temporal, and limited existence. A resignation to reflexivity con­
fesses that we cannot—despite the promises of neocolonial consumerism—give 
ourselves any cultural location we wish. We can turn to "other" cultures for a 
variety of ideas, practices, signs, and symbols, but precisely the possibility of 
making that turn defines and limits our location. A resignation to reflexivity be­
gins with an acknowledgment of this givenness of our location and then at­
tempts to understand and improve it rather than leap outside it. Such a resigna­
tion is a kind of choice, but it is a choice in the limited sense of choosing to 
acknowledge the constraints on choice. The bricoleur experiences himself or 
herself at a distance from a bazaar full of cultural bits and bobs and therefore 
free to choose between all of them. The self-reflexive bricoleur, however, sees 
the culture of the bazaar itself as the location that the bricoleur did not choose 
and from which he or she cannot escape simply through some combination of 
wish, denial, and obfuscation. For the Christian social critic, a resignation to re­
flexivity means accepting this curious combination of freedom and constraint as 
the place from which one is called and to which one is called to bear witness. 
A Resignation to Hodgepodge 
The idealism of uncritical bricolage tends to construct its source cultures not 
only as others but also as wholes. Delores Williams, for instance, distilled from 
the contentious, vibrant conversation of African American religious traditions a 
single, univocal "invisible black church." Williams used many sources to con­
struct the culture that authorized her critique, but she constructed it in the sin­
gular. The singularity of Williams's invisible black church depended on one 
unifying idea. Everything within the invisible black church supported the sur­
vival and sustained the quality of life of African American women. The power of 
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that single idea allowed Williams to bind together practices and persons from 
very different religious communities. It also provided a boundary that distin-
guished the invisible black church from any other culture. Williams's idealism 
constructed a singular, unified, and bounded culture to which she could turn. 
The cultural whole of the invisible black church came into existence only in 
and through Williams's ideal construction of it. Williams made visible but did 
not critically consider her active role in conjuring a unified alternative culture. 
Especially in her consideration of the Universal Hagar's Spiritual Church, Wil-
liams began to suggest (and even celebrate) the complexity, diversity, and 
hybridity that marked the cultural fragments from which she abstracted the in-
visible black church. Apart from the idealism of uncritical bricolage, source cul-
tures appear not as singular, unified, and bounded but as plural, contentious, 
and differentiated by fuzzy, permeable borders. A self-critical bricolage will in-
volve a willingness to turn to this cultural hodgepodge behind the constructed 
whole.20 
A resignation to hodgepodge and hybridity makes a difference in the way a 
bricoleur conceives of the basic elements of cultures. "Practices," for example, 
have returned to a rightful place of prominence in Anglo-American moral and 
theological discourse in large part thanks to the efforts of Alasdair Maclntyre. 
Maclntyre's influential version of the cultural turn moved practices to the cen-
ter but defined practices in a way that implicitly encouraged the idealism of an 
uncritical bricoleur. A practice, Maclntyre wrote, "is never just a set of technical 
skills." What made a practice a practice, in Maclntyre's sense, was the presence 
of some end that the actor consciously sought in performing the practice. The 
end of a practice could change over time, but participating in the practice at any 
particular moment meant pursuing the end given by the history of the practice 
to date. The ideal end—not the characteristic way a person moved his or her 
body, not the habituated form in which he or she spoke—defined the practice. 
The ideal end defined the practice in a way that secured its singularity, internal 
unity, and clear boundaries.21 
Maclntyre's idealist definition of practice obscured both similarities and dif-
ferences between human practices. Unifying under a single practice everything 
Christians have ever described as "preaching," for instance, can set up some 
heuristically useful comparisons. Considering such a wide practice of preaching 
as having some kind of existence over and apart from the ideal construction of 
it, however, suggests some continuities that are tenuous and hides other conti-
nuities that are much stronger. A second-century preacher in Alexandria and a 
late-twentieth-century preacher in a gentrifying American neighborhood can 
be juxtaposed in illuminating ways, but the idea that they share in a single, con-
tinuous practice hides as much as it reveals. Uniting them as participants in a 
single practice papers over the deep ruptures and discontinuities between the 
two. It also renders invisible the important strategies, actions, personas, and 
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techniques that they shared with contemporaries who did not share their con­
scious ends. If similarities between preachers and those engaged in poetry, poli­
tics, and sales do appear in a Maclntyrean account of practice, they appear only 
as the corruption of one practice or another. A more material, embodied sense 
of practice can help bring the complex hurly-burly of continuities and disconti­
nuities to light.22 
Pierre Bourdieu, for instance, defined a practice not by the telos an actor 
sought but by the habitus he or she enacted. Bourdieu described habitus as a "du­
rable transposable disposition" that could migrate between and across social 
spheres. A practice of telling stories to illustrate points, for instance, moved be­
tween religious, legal, and entertainment spheres in the first decades of the 
nineteenth century. Even when actors in each sphere pursued different con­
scious ends, they shared a habitus that defined the practice.23 In one of his rich­
est passages, Bourdieu explained this mobile, flexible quality of the habitus: 
The structures constitutive of a particular type of environment (e.g., the ma­
terial conditions of existence characteristic of a class condition) produce 
habitus, systems of durable transposable dispositions, structured structures pre­
disposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles of the gen­
eration and structuring of practices and representations which can be objec­
tively "regulated" and "regular" without in any way being the product of 
obedience to rules, objectively adapted to their goals without presupposing a 
conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of operations necessary to at­
tain them and, being all this, collectively orchestrated without being the 
product of the orchestrating action of a conductor.24 
Bourdieu's notion of the habitus enabled him to conceive of cultural practices 
as "regulated improvisations" that did not require conscious obedience to rules 
or conscious pursuit of particular ends. T h e practice itself carried what 
Bourdieu called an "objective intention"—an end embedded in the characteris­
tic form of the action that actors performed with or without conscious agree­
ment. Practices could retain their objective intentions, and thus some identity as 
a practice, even as people adapted them across many different social settings 
and with many different ends in mind. 2 5 
Bourdieu's more strongly performative sense of practice begins to hint at a 
very different picture of the "culture" to which a bricoleur might turn: not to a 
singular, unified, bounded whole, defined by a conscious intention, but to 
spheres, traditions, and institutions criss-crossed by multiple practices embody­
ing a variety of objective and subjective intentions. Without the unifying power 
of a prior ideal, the cultures to which a critic turns could be marked by strong 
internal tensions and even outright contradictions. Tensions might arise be­
tween practices or even within practices—between objective and subjective 
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intentions, for instance. The possibility of tensions within a culture comple-
ments the possibility of agreements with persons, actions, and institutions be-
yond its very porous boundaries. When habitus, not conscious intention, defines 
a practice, extensive traffic across cultures can become visible as something 
other than a fall from idealist purity. 
For Christians this more materialist and performative understanding of cul-
ture might suggest an ecclesiology in which churches encompass competing 
ideals within themselves and stand endlessly intertwined with a wide array of 
other institutions beyond themselves. Without the idealist's drive to bounded 
wholes, internal pluralism and external connection need not be regarded as 
flaws. Multiple ends within a church allow it to speak and enact a gospel as com-
plex as the Word to which the church bears witness. Moreover, shared practices 
enable a church to enact a kind of public witness that can be undertaken in ex-
plicitly, particularly theological language. As practices move across social 
spheres they retain objective intentions, roles, rules, moods, and motives. Even 
without agreement about conscious intentions or ultimate purposes, reform in 
one sphere tends to migrate into others. Thus, a critic might treat the migration 
of practices between churches and other social spheres not as a rash of impuri-
ties that must be washed or wished away but as a series of opportunities for criti-
cal engagement that do not require a church to abandon its first, explicitly theo-
logical language. Through the transmigration of practices critical, theological 
reflection on church practices becomes critical, theological—and potentially 
transformative—reflection on crucial elements of social spheres such as law, 
politics, economics, and entertainment. Practical theology becomes social eth-
ics.26 
A Resignation to Allegory 
Self-critical bricolage requires starting, as Bertolt Brecht said, not from the good 
old things but from the bad new ones.27 Brecht's negative evaluation of his 
starting point jars a reader into recognition of a third resignation necessary for 
more fully critical bricolage: resignation to the moral and theological ambiguity 
of the cultural artifacts to which a critic turns. Wheat and tares grow together, 
even in the plots of a cultural field selected for use in bricolage. Hauerwas and 
Williams acknowledged (explicitly or implicitly) the mixed qualities of the cul-
tural piles from which they picked out their chosen artifacts, but they did not 
acknowledge the deep ambiguities of the chosen artifacts themselves. Williams, 
for instance, denounced the patriarchy mixed in with liberative elements in the 
visible African American denominations. The names on her roll call of saints 
appeared, however, as holy and without blemish. Moreover, to put a sharper 
point on the argument, she presented the practices of liberation and survival as 
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not only realizing their ideals but also as realizing ultimate ideals. Such practices 
become places where hope and history fused to become practically identical 
with one another.28 Precisely this union of historical fact with theological hope 
charged the pieces with the aura that gave Williams's critique such power. Cri­
tique of the culture of bricolage must forgo such magic, however. A critic who 
made the first two resignations I describe, to reflexivity and plurality, without 
making a third, to the mixed moral quality of the materials to which the critic 
turned, would end up uncritically endorsing the culture of bricolage. Such a 
critic would simply celebrate the status quo of a massive cultural sphere offering 
an array of goods to savvy shoppers. Such a cultural turn would be self-con­
scious, even reflexive, but insufficiently critical. (It would be a turn in the style 
of Madonna or Beck, or some of their admirers in cultural studies.) Critique 
from within a culture of bricolage requires resignation not only to that cultural 
location but also to its moral mixedness. It requires renouncing the easy re­
union of theological truth and cultural artifact, whether that reunion is decreed 
in the imagined past, the marginalized present, or the practice of bricolage itself. 
To borrow language from literary criticism, critique from within a culture of 
bncolage requires renouncing the ideology of symbolism for the fractured power 
of allegory. Symbol and allegory have been contrasted in many ways, but in this 
essay I rely on the distinctions Walter Benjamin made between symbol and al­
legory in his 1925 study of the "sorrow plays" (Trauerspiele) from the Baroque 
period in Germany. In a symbolic construct, Benjamin wrote, "the beautiful is 
supposed to merge with the divine in an unbroken whole." Allegory, on the 
other hand, made reference not from wholes but from fragments and ruins dis­
connected from that to which they were supposed to make reference. Allegory 
separated signifier and signified. The crucial difference came in allegory's will­
ingness to take temporality into itself, to give up any pretension of being a fixed, 
eternal order. Symbols presented themselves as unchanging—akin to the silent, 
unchanging natural world of plants and mountains. Allegories, however, took 
time into the very act of signification. They presented themselves as human fab­
rications with limited life spans. An allegory always stood at some level of de­
cay—a ruin on its way to further ruin, wearing out with time and use. As a ruin, 
it disrupted any pretension that its appearance was identical with what it signi­
fied. An allegory made appearance {Schein) visible as appearance. Thus shatter­
ing the totality of Schein, allegory enabled reference from a ruin more thor­
oughly temporal to a reality more genuinely transcendental.29 
Symbolic fusions of hope and history become uncritical in one way, but cyn­
ical denials of any relationship between hope and history slip into a different yet 
equally uncritical combination. A total separation of hope and history reverts to 
the modernist crisis I sketched briefly at the beginning of this essay, in which a 
deep divide separates God and culture and leaves humans stranded in culture. 
Such a division allows empiricist history and idealist theology to collude to 
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divide the world between them. Both lose critical power. This radical separa-
tion of norm and fact grants an autonomy to the existing array of facts that 
makes them harder to change. Facts become unchangeable givens, and norms 
become irrelevant for historical realities. Critique that discards as ideological 
every notion of moral or theological depth to historical realities becomes itself a 
kind of ideology.30 
Theological hope and historical fact can neither be blended seamlessly to-
gether nor torn permanently apart. Instead, as Benjamin wrote, theology 
should function as a kind of "commentary" on historical reality. Hope and his-
tory should be held together but without loss of the distinctions between them. 
Critique must give up attempts to construct symbols that fuse heavenly hopes 
with cultural realities even as it renounces work that makes the two irrelevant 
for one another. Critique should turn instead to making allegories that juxta-
pose the actual and the ideal in ways that accent both their connection and their 
difference.31 
In the Baroque period allegorical juxtaposition without fusion depended on 
devices such as the caption. A visual allegorist such as Albrecht Dürer—a kiss-
ing cousin of the Trauerspiel dramatists—used captions to place claims about 
moral or theological meanings next to pictures of empirical or historical enti-
ties. Dürer's technique of caption and picture held truth-claim and representa-
tion next to one another without dissolving them into a single, unified symbol. 
Because Dürer's pictures put representations together in ways that interrupted 
the usual, easy, seemingly natural patterns of reference to some meaning behind 
them, he blocked any chance for the representations to function as "natural 
symbols." The representations would require the addition of a caption to be-
come meaningful. Yet just as the pictures required captions, the captions re-
quired pictures. The picture in an allegory did not simply "illustrate" an idea al-
ready complete in itself; it played off the idea in ways that gave it new depth and 
substance. As the lavish details of Dürer's woodcuts suggested, a caption made 
attention to material reality more important, not less. The truth of an allegori-
cal woodcut lay neither in the caption nor the picture, neither in the signified 
nor the signifier. Instead, truth came pouring out of the spaces between the 
two.32 
So: good for woodcuts. But what would a resignation to allegory look like in 
cultural criticism? The timbre of Benjamin's terms already suggests connec-
tions. Benjamin asked how the critic could move from what he called historische 
Sachgehalt to what he called philosophische Wahrheitsgehalt: from historical 
thing-content to philosophical truth-content. Benjamin's terms offer useful 
tools for asking the question raised by the cultural turn: How might a moral 
theologian move from cultural is to theological ought, from the historical 
thing-content of cultural artifacts to the theological truth-content of claims 
about ways to cooperate with God's presence and activity in the world?33 
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Benjamin did not try to resolve these questions by pining for a return to in­
nocence or some other kind of dissolution of the gap that a critical perspective 
opened up between historical thing-content and philosophical truth-content. 
Instead, he insisted that the critic should open the gap wider still. T h e world of 
historical thing-content—the present order of powers and principalities—pre­
sented itself as a complete account of reality and aspired to the status of a "sec­
ond nature." T h e critic, Benjamin wrote, needed to mortify historical content to 
reveal it as the false totality it was. If historical thing-content pretended to total­
ity, however, how could a critic find a place outside it from which to criticize it 
before the critique had been done? Benjamin cultivated a set of strategies for 
mortification as immanent critique, working entirely from felt contact with his­
torical content to reveal the rifts and crevices in its pretense of wholeness. 
Benjamin especially mortified historical content by moving to the center that 
which second nature had consigned to the gutter—stamp collectors, outmoded 
forms of architecture, even material objects themselves. Different historical 
contents required different strategies, however. Rifts and crevices could appear 
in the logic internal to a cultural practice, in the tension between what it said 
and what it did, or in the bodies that lay hidden behind the cloak of claims to be 
eternally given, a church not made with hands. 3 4 Whatever strategy the critic 
used, mortification took the form of alchemy: It turned historical thing-content 
into its opposite—revealing, for instance, freedom as fate, culture as nature, and 
self-denying "agapic" love as the desire to turn the beloved into a corpse guar­
anteed to give no pleasure in return. Such mortification was not accomplished 
primarily by critics. T h e passage of time wore down and wore out the forms of 
life that animated cultural practices, leaving them standing as ruins. In Hegel's 
language, forms of life grew old. Humans lived among the always already mor­
tified. T h e critic, as Nietzsche wrote, merely gave a push to what was already 
tottering.3 5 
Although Benjamin called the critic to see symbolic structures as mortified, 
he did not suggest that the critic should then simply write off the ruins as irrele­
vant. Unlike Georg Lukács, who coined the term "second nature," Benjamin 
did not regard the false totality of historical content as something to be broken 
up and then discarded: 
The object of philosophical criticism is to show that the function of artistic 
form is as follows: to make historical content [historische Sachgehalte], such as 
provides the basis of every important work of art, into a philosophical truth 
[philosophischen Wahrheitsgehalten]. This transformation of material content 
into truth content makes the decrease in effectiveness, whereby the attraction 
of the earlier charms diminishes decade by decade, into the basis for a rebirth 
[Neugeburt], in which all ephemeral beauty is completely stripped off, and the 
work stands as ruin.36 
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Benjamin did not suggest that the critic could or should strip off mere ap-
pearances to reveal something "real" underneath. Instead, as Jürgen Habermas 
rightly noted, Benjamin's style of critique sought both to expose the preten-
sions of historical thing-content and to re-present them in ways that witnessed 
to the fulfillment of their promises in spite of themselves. Habermas dubbed 
this style Rettendekritik, a critique set on redeeming. Benjamin, he wrote, morti-
fied appearance only to "transpose" it "from the medium of the beautiful into 
that of the true and thereby to redeem it."37 Benjamin's goal was not to do away 
with historical content but, in seeing it for what it was, to redeem it in a higher 
state. 
Benjamin took the utmost care to distinguish his allegorical "redemption" 
from every kind of arbitrary transformation by the critical subject. He rejected, 
for instance, the purely subjective reconstruction of meaning performed by the 
Trauerspiel allegorists. Seeing the world full of ruined signs severed froim what 
they formerly signified, German allegorists in the post-Reformation period 
reinfused the world with meaning of their own choosing and dared to call this 
"resurrection." They acted as if they could make the meaning of their choice 
and so broke faith with the body. Benjamin rebuked such solutions for assuming 
that the world had become nothing but ruins, as if the original gift of meaning 
could be totally destroyed. Such a view—seemingly enlightened to every gap 
between truth and history—simply replicated the dominant new "second na-
ture," the appearance that human beings were the source of all value. In pre-
suming that human beings could make meaning ex nihilo, the arbitrary allego-
rists forgot the dependence of meaning on a gift already given. Their 
"spiritualized" resurrection broke faith with the world of things, not redeeming 
them at all but leaving them behind. Such false redemption, Benjamin wrote, 
was treulos. It was faithless, breaking the covenant of truth with history. It was 
not "true" in either sense of the English word: neither faithful nor truthful. In-
stead of claiming to make whatever meaning there was, Benjamin proposed a 
true redemptive critique that mortified semblances with the confidence that one 
simply released an original gift always already in them. Meaning was not the 
critic's to make. Benjamin's restraint from making new meaning could seem 
like nihilism, but it was nothing of the sort. It was a critique of the merely sub-
jective invention of meaning that was the real nihilism, the real source of the 
melancholy that stalked the Trauerspiele. 
Benjamin's insistence on fidelity to the body, to the world of appearances, 
depended on his sense that even ruins held some inalienable gift of life and 
meaning. He wrote elusively and allusively about that inalienable gift through-
out his career. Perhaps his clearest—and certainly his most materialist—exposi-
tion came very late in his life, in the great unfinished bundles of notes, quotes, 
clippings, and theory that came to be called The Arcades Project (Das 
Passagen-Werk). In a 1935 exposé of the project Benjamin described the 
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inalienable presence of the primordial gift as dwelling in a "collective uncon­
sciousness." The phrase carried unfortunate baggage from C. G.Jung and Lud­
wig Klages, and Benjamin's friends urged him not to use it. Theodor Adorno 
wrote Benjamin to argue that reliance on collective unconsciousness robbed 
critique of its "crucial and objective liberating potential." When the gift to be 
released became part of the content of consciousness, Adorno argued, its critical 
power over and against prevailing social consciousness waned. Adorno's pre­
scription was strong and surprising. He demanded the reintroduction of the 
theological content that had marked the earlier exposés. Adorno clearly did not 
call for a Parisian Dogmatics, but it is not entirely clear what he did want: "A res-
toration of theology, or better still, a radicalization of dialectic introduced into 
the glowing heart of theology, would simultaneously require the utmost inten-
sification of the social-dialectical, and indeed economic, motifs. Above all, these 
must be grasped historically."38 By any means necessary, Adorno wanted 
Benjamin's dialectical images to transcend collective consciousness to retain the 
power to critique collective consciousness. Adorno called for something more, 
something beyond even collective subjectivity. 
Perhaps in response to Adorno, or perhaps simply making visible ideas that 
already were latent within his work, Benjamin took care to reject Ernst Bloch's 
great faith in "the consciousness of the collective"—a phrase Williams would 
echo in calling on "the soul of community memory"—the ability of a society or 
community to dream its way into a really new future, to pull itself up by the 
bootstraps of its own visions. The consciousness of the collective could only re-
produce itself and thus endlessly extend the semblance of second nature. 
Benjamin described instead a collective unconscious infused with memories of a 
past it did not make. Because it held memories shot through with primordial 
gift, it could add a genuinely critical, genuinely Utopian, dimension to dialecti-
cal images of every kind, from buildings to fashions to sermons. 
The most helpful device for Benjamin in describing this recollection of pri-
mordial gift was Marcel Proust's notion of "involuntary memory." Memory 
could be truly critical when it remained independent of will and even con-
sciousness in important ways. At the same time it remained historical—really 
present in people, practices, and even objects—even if it was not subject to the 
will of any of them. This present presence made it "historical" even if it was not 
a memory of some historical set of events, even if it was a "memory" of time be-
fore time. Involuntary memory allowed Benjamin to speak about a critical 
power present in empirical practices yet distinct from every conscious plan or 
action, past or present, individual or collective. It was a memory of time before 
second nature, a dream deeper than any intention. 
There is, as Adorno wrote, something irreducibly theological here. A Chris-
tian cultural critic might think of this primordial gift as something like the 
imago Dei. It is a gift: received, not made. It is a gift that cannot be exchanged. It 
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can be scarred and effaced but never completely lost. It is both forsaken promise 
and forgotten foretaste of redemption. It is the deep to which deep calls. Trans-
posing these themes into the key of ecclesiology, we might think of the gift as 
the presence of Christ in the church. Breathed out in an act of self-sharing, that 
presence dwells in the church in spite of the church. It lingers, forgotten and ef-
faced but nonetheless present, in practices, stories, beliefs, and saints. It lives in 
all the cultural artifacts of visible churches. Its release depends not so much on 
the completion of those cultural artifacts—a teasing out of their potential, a lit-
tle topping up of a good start—as on their mortification and redemption. The 
practices of the visible church bear the gospel gift not in their approximations of 
excellence, not with plausible words of wisdom, but with a demonstration of the 
Spirit and of power (I Cor. 2:4), a power made visible precisely at the breaking 
points. Such an ecclesiology resists reduction to caricatures both of a Roman 
Catholic "sacramental" perspective and of a Protestant "critical" perspective. 
Critique that has learned from Benjamin would reject both the fusion of history 
and theology and their radical separation. It would reject both the ideology of 
the symbol and the ideology that allows empiricist history and idealist theology 
to divide the world between them. It would insist on the gift of presence in and 
in spite of, through and against, the practices of visible churches. 
Confession as a Caption 
In this essay I attempt to perform what I attempt to describe: a cultural turn re-
signed to reflexivity, hodgepodge, and allegory. The resignation to reflexivity— 
to the bad, new things—came in my turn to the cultural turn, specifically to the 
practice of bricolage. I have tried to think through the possibilities for theologi-
cal criticism not by starting from a blank methodological slate but by turning to 
a practice shared by Delores Williams and Stanley Hauerwas. Although I have 
criticized their work as bricoleurs, I do not mean to suggest that I am doing any-
thing but a kind of bricolage. I simply want to call bricoleurs to acknowledge their 
role and its deep entanglement with some dominant forces that cut across many 
contemporary societies. The best bricolage will include some self-conscious in-
terrogation of the role of the bricoleur. 
The resignation to hodgepodge—the willingness to turn to the bad, new 
things (in the plural)—came in my turn to the particular practice of bricolage. I 
have not tried to turn to some unified modern, postmodern, or critical culture. 
Instead, I have considered a single practice as two virtuosic practitioners have 
enacted it. Hauerwas and Williams performed bricolage with different ends in 
mind, like two people improvising on the same theme. That common practice 
shaped but did not exhaustively define their larger projects or the cultural loca-
tions from which they wrote. They also shared the practice of bricolage with 
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people working in other social spheres. T h e term itself already bears the stamps 
of many border crossings: It comes to theology and ethics from the social sci­
ences, and variations of the term show up across academic discourses and in 
places such as hip-hop, contemporary visual art, and popular advertisements. A 
critical consideration of methodological issues in Christian theology and ethics 
therefore gestures toward broader cultural criticism. 
T h e resignation to allegory—the willingness to begin with the bad, new 
tilings—began with a moment of mortification. Turns to culture (including my 
own) stood exposed as ruins, unable to keep the promise of critique because 
they replicated what most needed critique: the position of an individual select­
ing and arranging cultural artifacts. Therefore I have not even hoped to enact a 
version of bricolage that is complete in itself. Instead I have performed bricolage 
as something like a broken signifier, a ruin waiting for redemption. What kind 
of caption might testify to its redemption? How might the cultural turns made 
by Hauerwas, Williams, me, and many others be redeemed, in and in spite of 
themselves? 
Perhaps redemption might become visible through a caption of confession. 
That caption would need to borrow from two common senses of the word: It 
would need to suggest both a confession of sin and a confession of faith. Con­
fession of sin—of our entanglement in and even support for the orders, powers, 
and practices we try to criticize—enacts a kind of mortification. Such thorough 
mortification only makes sense—only becomes possible, imaginable, worth­
while—with confidence in the presence of an abiding gift. Thus, these cultural 
turns also take the form of confessions of faith. They confess a faith that God 
abides in and works for the redemption of this world, the world of seeker 
churches and flags in sanctuaries; of class pride disguised as fidelity to tradition; 
of racism, sexism, and tender hatred of gay and lesbian people; of megamalls 
and hipster coffee shops and churches that look like both of them; of academic 
journals in Christian ethics and, people who, like it or not, do theological criti­
cism through turns to culture. 
Notes 
1. The phrase a "view from nowhere"—and an elegant statement of the problem—appeared 
in Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986). 
I borrow the language of a "cultural turn" from Fredric Jameson. I believe Jameson's 
clear articulation of the swollen importance of the cultural sphere (or, better, cultural 
spheres) amounted to a significant breakthrough. His structuralist assumptions, however, 
forced that realization into a singular, monolithic account of "postmodernity" that could 
not account for the tension, variety, and vitality that close empirical studies suggest. Cf. 
Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (Durham, N.C.: 
Duke University Press, 1991), esp. ix-xxii. 
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Kathryn Tanner neatly parsed and problematized what I am calling the cultural turn in 
theology in Theories of Culture (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1997). Another good general 
discussion of the cultural turn in theology appears in Sheila Greve Davaney, "Theology 
and the Turn to Cultural Analysis," in Converging on Culture: Theologians in Dialogue with 
Cultural Analysis and Criticism, ed. Delwin Brown, Sheila Greve Davaney, and Kathryn 
Tanner (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 3-16. Like Davaney, I am trying to point 
to "common themes with broad credence," not some "spurious consensus." 
George Lindbeck remains the locus classicus of the postliberal version of the cultural 
turn. Lindbeck used the work of Clifford Geertz to put an anthropological spin on the lin-
guistic turn associated with Ludwig Wittgenstein, arriving at the idea of religion a$ a "cul-
tural-linguistic system" that grounded human knowledge of God and the world. Church 
culture as a form of life became primary, doctrine a kind of secondary grammar. See 
George Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age (Phila-
delphia: Westminster Press, 1984). 
Jeffrey Stout's Democracy and Tradition (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
2004) shows how a cultural turn could sustain liberalism as well as postliberalism. Stout of-
fered a breakthrough defense of democracy by turning not to something like the ontology 
of individual consciousness but to the complex cultural traditions of the United States. 
Womanist theologians Joan M. Martin, m More Than Chains and Toil: A Christian Work 
Ethic of Enslaved Women (Louisville, Ky.: Westminster John Knox Press, 2000), and Traci 
C. West, in Wounds of the Spirit: Black Women, Violence, and Resistance Ethics (New York: 
New York University Press, 1999), also made the cultural turn in directions that coiuld sus-
tain liberal politics. Both Martin and West added substantial empirical dimensions to their 
cultural turns. Although there are important differences between womanist and mujerista 
theologies, they share at least this renewed attention to the lives of particular communities. 
A good example is Ada Maria Isasi-Diaz, En La Lucha (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993). 
Liberation theologians from Africa and Latin America were among the first to make the 
turn I am trying to describe. See, for instance, Mercy Amba Oduyoye, Heanng and 
Knowing: Theological Reflections on Christianity in Africa (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 
1986). 
Radically orthodox theologian John Milbank made what I am calling a turn to church 
culture—and made explicit the Hegelian affinities of this turn—when he called for theol-
ogy as a kind oí Sittlichkeit of the church. See John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory: Be-
yond Secular Reason (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1990), 381 and passim. Catherine 
Pickstock sought to ground meaning in the particular cultural practice of the Roman Mass 
in After Writing: On the Liturgical Consummation of Philosophy (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1998). 
2. For a precise statement of this line of questioning, see Jeffrey Stout, Ethics after Babel: The 
Languages of Morals and Their Discontents (Boston: Beacon Press, 1988), 2%\ff. 
3. Self-consciously turning to culture leads me to write about contemporary figures in the 
simple past tense. This choice of tenses rejects the convention of writing about history in 
the past while writing theology and philosophy in the eternal literary present. It also rejects 
the distinctions that convention reifies: between word and deed, idea and event, writing 
and speaking, and thinker and mere mortal. Bridging the gulf between theology and his-
tory begins with speaking about them in a common language. This approach borrows the 
tense convention of a newspaper: It reports as past events the words and deeds of people 
who may still live in the today of this text and who may speak or write these or very similar 
words again. ¡ 
4. Stanley Hauerwas, With the Grain of the Universe (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Brazos Press, 
2001), 184^ 
5. Ibid., 191 η. 38; 192 η. 40. 
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6. Ibid., 145; emphasis added. 
7. It is worth noting that if the visible church is holy, it stands above critique. It certainly 
could not be critiqued from "outside," by the world whose ways are not its ways. Moreover, 
because of Hauerwas's conception of the church as a "tradition" in Alasdair Maclntyre's 
sense, it also could not be critiqued from "below." A tradition has resources proper to it 
that could be used for internal critique, but those resources could not be invoked without 
interpretation—and the "masters of the guild," the visible hierarchy of the visible church, 
offer definitive interpretation. See Alasdair Maclntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral The­
ory, 2d ed. (London: Duckworth, 1985), 204-25. Hauerwas had just such a picture in mind 
when he rejected appeals to scripture against church practices. Before scripture can be 
rightly read—before the Word can be heard—the reader must be inducted into a commu­
nity of right readership. The Word cannot be known apart from the church. This point is 
the center of Stanley Hauerwas's argument in Unleashing the Scriptures: Freeing the Bible 
from Captivity to America (Nashville, Tenn.: Abingdon Press, 1993). I argue below that 
Delores S. Williams made the story of Hagar secondary to the community's interpretive 
power in the same way. 
8. Delores S. Williams, Sisters in the Wilderness: The Challenge of Womanist God-Talk (Mary-
knoll, N.Y.: Orbis, 1993), xi, 202. 
9. Ibid., 1-15. 
10. Ibid., 6; emphasis in original. 
11. Ibid., xü. 
12. Ibid., 206; emphasis in original. 
13. Ibid., 205-6. On the Universal Hagar's Spiritual Church, see pp. 219-39. 
14. Note that I am not arguing that the critical strategy of Hauerwas and Williams had prob-
lems because it was circular, with a critical ideal defining a culture that then was supposed 
to justify the ideal. That circle was present, and others may criticize it, but I think the drive 
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